Our soldiers over in Iraq use a staggering array of hardware, and some of it works better than others. You could certainly write a really interesting book about the creative and political process that resulted in each one, from initial concept through design and manufacture, to trained soldier trying to use the thing on the battlefield. And here is a sample of one of our soldiers writing about those weapons in Iraq:
“5) The M240 Machine Gun: 7.62 Nato (.308) cal. belt fed machine gun, developed to replace the old M-60 (what a beautiful weapon that was!!). Thumbs up. Accurate, reliable, and the 7.62 round puts ‘em down. Originally developed as a vehicle mounted weapon, more and more are being dismounted and taken into the field by infantry. The 7.62 round chews up the structure over there…”
Mostly Cajun: A Marine’s Iraq observations
Can’t you just imagine carrying a weapon designed for vehicle mount? Creative repurposing is something designers learn to expect, but which is impossible to predict.
Leave for another essay the question of whether we should even be in Iraq in the first place: the fact is we are there and our solders should be well-equipped. I hope someone at the Pentagon is tasked with reading informal assessments like this piece. For the rest of us, it is a reminder that when senator Lardbottom stands up and pitches for funding a weapon system (that happens to be made in his home state) there are real consequences for our soldiers.
Another interesting, and troubling, aspect of the essay is the sophistication of the enemy weapons and tactics being supplied by Iran. Go read!
Unfortunately, weapon systems sometimes only incidentally seem to have “how well will it work in the field” as a priority. Like any other project, the guy who thinks it up and the managers who approve it and the folks who benefit from its funding all end up having a stake in the project that is irrelevant to its utility, only to its progress—and that’s true for everyone from politicians to Pentagon types (the more political the more so) to weapons contractors.
If—*if*—we were regularly at war, then there might be more thought given to the consequences of such policy. Instead, though, war is seen as an exception, and even if someone along the way considers what might happen if something doesn’t work, the consequences are seen as trivial, because the assumption made, even among the least political, is that the stuff most likely won’t be used (unlikely enough, at least, to let them sleep at night).